Publications
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Forthcoming - "The legacy of war: The effect of militias on postwar repression" Conflict Management and Peace Science, online first (with Sabine Carey) [Open Access]
Abstract: How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As “tried and tested” agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a “fall-back option”, which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.
Abstract: How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As “tried and tested” agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a “fall-back option”, which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.
2020 - "Grist to the Mill of Subversion: Strikes and Coups in Counterinsurgencies" European Journal of International Relations, 26(4) 1032–106 (with Christian Gläßel and Adam Scharpf) [Open Access]
Abstract: Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring, a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of resistance, this paper analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks affect the military's disposition and ability to stage a coup during counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers interpret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military will terminate costly walkouts. This alignment of interests fosters military takeovers. We provide case-study evidence that shows our suggested mechanisms at work and demonstrate the scope of our argument using quantitative analyses of coup attempts in counterinsurgencies (1950-2005). Strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and rebel attacks do not.
Abstract: Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring, a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of resistance, this paper analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks affect the military's disposition and ability to stage a coup during counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers interpret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military will terminate costly walkouts. This alignment of interests fosters military takeovers. We provide case-study evidence that shows our suggested mechanisms at work and demonstrate the scope of our argument using quantitative analyses of coup attempts in counterinsurgencies (1950-2005). Strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and rebel attacks do not.
2020 - "The Power to Resist: Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War" Comparative Political Studies, 53(13): 2029–2060 (with Sara Polo)[Open Access]
Abstract: Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is ``effective.'' Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels’ constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels’ need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels’ terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989–2009) and of ISIS tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument.
Abstract: Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is ``effective.'' Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels’ constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels’ need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels’ terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989–2009) and of ISIS tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument.
2020 - "The value of sub-national data: The dynamics of contentious politics in Nepal" International Area Studies Review, 23(3): 307–322 (with Johannes Vüllers) [Open Access]
Abstract: Over the last decade, a renewed interest in the empirical analysis of contentious politics has led to significant improvements on the quality and quantity of data. The related wave of research has thus turned to analyze dynamics of contentious politics from a comparative perspective. Unfortunately, these studies use country level datasets for their analysis, creating a mismatch between the original actor based theoretical framework and the empirical conceptualization of contentious collective action. We discuss the conceptual challenges this theoretical-empirical gap generates and highlight how contentious dynamics can be studied with a bottom-up sub-national approach. To do so, we present a new fine-grained dataset of contentious collective action in post-conflict Nepal (2007-2010). We descriptively show how this type of data can help us improve our understanding on repertoires of contentious politics. This paper highlights the relevance of gathering information on active organizations to study the inherent dynamics of contentious politics.
Abstract: Over the last decade, a renewed interest in the empirical analysis of contentious politics has led to significant improvements on the quality and quantity of data. The related wave of research has thus turned to analyze dynamics of contentious politics from a comparative perspective. Unfortunately, these studies use country level datasets for their analysis, creating a mismatch between the original actor based theoretical framework and the empirical conceptualization of contentious collective action. We discuss the conceptual challenges this theoretical-empirical gap generates and highlight how contentious dynamics can be studied with a bottom-up sub-national approach. To do so, we present a new fine-grained dataset of contentious collective action in post-conflict Nepal (2007-2010). We descriptively show how this type of data can help us improve our understanding on repertoires of contentious politics. This paper highlights the relevance of gathering information on active organizations to study the inherent dynamics of contentious politics.
2018 - "Transicion sin Violencia a una Democracia Limitada: Dinamicas Internas de la Transición Chilena" Iberoamericana: América Latina, España, y Portugal, Año XVIII (2018), Vol. 67
2017 - "Words and deeds: From incompatibilities to outcomes in anti-government disputes" Journal of Peace Research, 54(4): 468-483 (with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Dragana Vidović, and Peter B. White)
Abstract: Dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, yet violent and nonviolent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. We examine why some countries see the emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims, and why in some cases these organizational claims result in civil wars or nonviolent campaigns, while others see no large-scale collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the organized articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and nonviolent collective action. We test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 101 states from 1960 to 2012. We show that factors such as demography, economic development, and civil society have differential effects on these different stages and outcomes of mobilization. We demonstrate that the common finding that anocracies are more prone to civil war primarily stems from such regimes being more prone to see maximalist political demands that could lead to violent mobilization, depending on other factors conducive to creating focused military capacity. We find that non-democracy generally promotes nonviolent campaigns as anocracies and autocracies are both more likely to experience claims and more prone to nonviolent campaigns, conditional on claims.
Abstract: Dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, yet violent and nonviolent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. We examine why some countries see the emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims, and why in some cases these organizational claims result in civil wars or nonviolent campaigns, while others see no large-scale collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the organized articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and nonviolent collective action. We test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 101 states from 1960 to 2012. We show that factors such as demography, economic development, and civil society have differential effects on these different stages and outcomes of mobilization. We demonstrate that the common finding that anocracies are more prone to civil war primarily stems from such regimes being more prone to see maximalist political demands that could lead to violent mobilization, depending on other factors conducive to creating focused military capacity. We find that non-democracy generally promotes nonviolent campaigns as anocracies and autocracies are both more likely to experience claims and more prone to nonviolent campaigns, conditional on claims.
2015 - "Nonviolence as a weapon of the resourceful: From claims to tactics in mobilization" Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 20(4): 471-491 (with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Dragana Vidović, and Peter B. White)
Abstract: Recent world events have renewed interest among social movement scholars in strategies and associated outcomes in campaigns against nondemocratic regimes. Most comparative work is limited to large-scale mobilization and takes violent/nonviolent tactics as given, thereby overlooking prior group mobilization and initial tactic choice. While a chosen tactic is plausibly related to group characteristics and resources, we argue that the mobilization process underlying large-scale campaigns begins when groups stake claims and assess those claims’ potential. The proposed framework can help to explain both the specific tactics chosen and whether campaigns take on violent or nonviolent forms. We focus on grievances and the origins of mobilization through formulation of claims-making disputes over regime type, government composition, and electoral legitimacy—independent of mobilization—and consider how resources provide a comparative advantage for violence or nonviolence. An application to states in the former Soviet Union demonstrates the framework’s utility for understanding when claims evolve to violent and nonviolent mobilization.
Abstract: Recent world events have renewed interest among social movement scholars in strategies and associated outcomes in campaigns against nondemocratic regimes. Most comparative work is limited to large-scale mobilization and takes violent/nonviolent tactics as given, thereby overlooking prior group mobilization and initial tactic choice. While a chosen tactic is plausibly related to group characteristics and resources, we argue that the mobilization process underlying large-scale campaigns begins when groups stake claims and assess those claims’ potential. The proposed framework can help to explain both the specific tactics chosen and whether campaigns take on violent or nonviolent forms. We focus on grievances and the origins of mobilization through formulation of claims-making disputes over regime type, government composition, and electoral legitimacy—independent of mobilization—and consider how resources provide a comparative advantage for violence or nonviolence. An application to states in the former Soviet Union demonstrates the framework’s utility for understanding when claims evolve to violent and nonviolent mobilization.
